Financial crises, bank risk exposure and government financial policy

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1 Mativation and literature review





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- A common feature of many of current papers has been to extend the basic financial accelerator mechanism developed by Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Kiyotaki and Moore (1997)to financial intermediaries (banks) in order to capture the disruption of intermediation.
- The goal of the model:
 - Capturing a crisis when banks are highly vulnerable to risk
 - Why banks adopt a risky balance sheet
 - -capturing the side effect of the credit policy on moral hazard



• Bank's budget constraint:

$$Q_t s_t = n_t + q_t e_t + d_t$$

• Bank's networth:

$$n_t = R_{kt}Q_{t-1}s_{t-1} - R_{et}q_{t-1}e_{t-1} - R_td_{t-1}$$

• The fraction of bank assets funded by outside equity:

$$\chi_t = q_t e_t / Q_t s_t$$

• Leverage ratio:

$$Q_t s_t = \phi_t n_t$$

Table 2

Steady states.

| | No policy | | Credit policy | | Macroprudential policy ($\tau^s = 0.0061$) | |
|----------------------|-----------|-----------|---------------|-----------|--|-----------|
| | Low risk | High risk | Low risk | High risk | Low risk | High risk |
| Output | 23.821 | 23.53 | 24.18 | 23.85 | 24.04 | 23.83 |
| с | 18.58 | 18.37 | 18.82 | 18.58 | 18.73 | 18.57 |
| L | 8.16 | 8.08 | 8.26 | 8.16 | 8.22 | 8.15 |
| K | 209.52 | 206.16 | 214.34 | 210.46 | 212.48 | 210.41 |
| Ν | 31.77 | 38.02 | 30.05 | 37.11 | 30.85 | 37.72 |
| Risk free rate (%) | 4.08 | 3.72 | 4.06 | 3.68 | 4.05 | 3.56 |
| Spread (%) | 0.99 | 1.46 | 0.89 | 1.38 | 0.94 | 1.48 |
| x (%) | 10.12 | 15.16 | 9.63 | 13.35 | 18.77 | 21.98 |
| v | 1.63 | 1.38 | 1.76 | 1.42 | 1.81 | 1.54 |
| μ_{e} | 0.05 | 0.15 | 0.03 | 0.12 | 0.03 | 0.08 |
| μ_{s} | 0.29 | 0.16 | 0.33 | 0.19 | 0.37 | 0.27 |
| φ | 6.59 | 5.42 | 7.13 | 5.67 | 6.89 | 5.58 |
| QK/(N+xQK) | 3.95 | 2.98 | 4.23 | 3.23 | 3.00 | 2.51 |
| N/xQK | 1.50 | 1.22 | 1.46 | 1.32 | 0.77 | 0.82 |
| SD shock (%) | 0.69 | 2.07 | 0.69 | 2.07 | 0.69 | 2.07 |
| SD output growth (%) | 1.09 | 2.53 | 0.81 | 2.43 | 0.80 | 2.29 |

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No policy responce



Credit policy responce to crisis: low risk economy



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Credit policy responce to crisis: high risk economy



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Macroprudential along with credit policy in the high risk economy

$$(1+\tau_t)Q_ts_t = n_t + (1+\tau_t^s)q_te_t + d_t$$



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Macroprudential policy with out credit policy in the low risk economy



| Efficiency cost of credit policy ^a (bps) | Welfare gain from no policy in consumption equivalents (%) | | | | | |
|---|--|-------|-------|-------|--|--|
| | 0 | 10 | 25 | 50 | | |
| Credit policy | 0.268 | 0.220 | 0.149 | 0.029 | | |
| Macroprudential policy | 0.285 | 0.285 | 0.285 | 0.285 | | |
| Macroprudential and credit policy | 0.337 | 0.332 | 0.325 | 0.313 | | |

^a The corresponding values of (τ_1, τ_2) for efficiency costs of credit policy equal to 10, 25 and 50 bps are, respectively: (0.000125,0.0012), (0.000313,0.0031) and (0.000625,0.0062).

Image: A matrix and a matrix

Thank You:)

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