



MOTIVATION


Financial inclusion in the world







Percent of firms identifying access to finance as a major constraint




THE MODEL


Agents

- ** HETEROGENEOUS
- **LIVE FOR 2 PERIODS**
 - I.FIRST PERIOD:

 make credit participation
 occupational choice
 and investment decisions
 - II.Second Period:
 Optimal consumetion
 Bequest decision

Occupational choice





Saving regime

$$W^{S} = \begin{cases} (1+r^{d})b + (1-p)w & \text{for workers,} \\ \pi^{S}(b,z) & \text{for entrepreneurs} \end{cases}$$

$$\pi^{S}(b,z) = \max_{k,l} \quad (1-p)[z(k^{\alpha}l^{1-\alpha})^{1-\nu} - wl + (1-\delta)k] + p\eta(1-\delta)k + (1+r^{d})(b-k)$$
 subject to $k \leq b$.

OPTIMAL CONTRACT

$$(\Phi, \Delta, \Omega)$$

$$(k(b,z),b-\psi,\Omega)$$

where Φ, Δ, Ω is the amount of borrowing, the value of collateral, and the face value of the contract repsctively

Credit regime

$$(1-p)\Omega + p\min(\Omega, \eta(1-\delta)k + (1+r^d)(b-\psi)) = (1+r^d)k + p\chi k \cdot \mathbb{1}_{\{\eta(1-\delta)k + (1+r^d)(b-\psi) < \Omega\}}$$

$$\begin{split} \pi^C(b,z) &= \max_{k,l} \quad (1-p)[z(k^\alpha l^{1-\alpha})^{1-\nu} - wl + (1-\delta)k - \Omega + (1+r^d)(b-\psi) \\ &+ p \max(0,\eta(1-\delta)k + (1+r^d)(b-\psi) - \Omega), \\ \text{subject to} \quad k &\leq \lambda(b-\psi), \end{split}$$

DATA AND CALIBRATION

Overview of the Data

	Low-income countries			Emerging market economies			
	Uganda	Kenya	Mozambique	Malaysia	The Philippines	Egypt	
Savings (% of GDP)	8	15.4	7.1	39	25.7	24.5	
Collateral (% of loan)	173	120.8	92	64.6	238.4	85.5	
Firms with credit (%)	17.2	25.4	14.2	60.4	33.2	17.4	
Non-perfor. loan (%)	2.3	10.6	3.1	8.5	4.5	19.3	
Interest rate spread	10.9	8.5	8.2	3.3	4.3	6.1	
Overhead costs/assets	6.9	6.6	7.4	1.5	3.2	1.5	
Top 5% emp. share	53.8	54.1	41.3	29.5	52.7	58.4	
Top 10% emp. share	64.2	66.	55.8	46.3	65.7	72.7	
Top 20% emp. share	74.6	81	71.9	63.5	79	85.9	
Top 40% emp. share	86.4	93.2	87.2	84.1	90.8	95	

Data, model and calibrated parameters

		Ugano	la		Keny	a	Mozambique		ique
Target Moments	Data	Model	Parameter	Data	Model	Parameter	Data	Model	Parameter
Savings (% of GDP)	8	8	$\omega = 0.08$	15.4	15.4	$\omega = 0.15$	7.1	7.1	$\omega = 0.07$
Collateral (% of loan)	173	173	$\lambda = 1.58$	120.8	120.8	$\lambda = 1.83$	92	92	$\lambda = 2.09$
Firms with credit (%)	17.2	17.1	$\psi = 0.03$	25.4	25.1	$\psi = 0.07$	14.2	14.2	$\psi = 0.03$
Non-perfor. loan (%)	2.3	2.4	p = 0.15	10.6	5.8	p = 0.17	3.1	3.1	p = 0.14
Interest rate spread	10.9	8.9	$\chi = 0.90$	8.5	11.3	$\chi = 0.61$	8.2	11.2	$\chi = 0.95$
Overhead costs/assets	6.9	6.6	$\eta = 0.37$	6.6	6.5	$\eta = 0.45$	7.4	7.3	$\eta = 0.54$
Top 5% emp. share	53.8	52.9	$\theta = 4.80$	54.1	58.1	$\theta = 4.40$	41.3	46.9	$\theta = 6.00$
Top 10% emp. share	64.2	64.4		66.9	70.1		55.8	58.9	
Top 20% emp. share	74.6	74.7		81	80.5		71.9	69.1	
Top 40% emp. share	86.4	84.7		93.2	88.7		87.2	80.5	
	Malaysia		r	The Philippines			T		
		Malay	sia		The Philip	opines		$_{\rm Egyp}$	t
Target Moments	Data	Model	sıa Parameter	Data	Model	Parameter	Data	Model	t Parameter
Target Moments Savings (% of GDP)	Data 39						Data 24.5		
		Model	Parameter	Data	Model	Parameter		Model	Parameter
Savings (% of GDP)	39	Model 39	Parameter $\omega = 0.39$	Data 25.7	Model 25.7	Parameter $\omega = 0.26$	24.5	Model 24.5	Parameter $\omega = 0.25$
Savings (% of GDP) Collateral (% of loan)	39 64.6	Model 39 64.6	Parameter $\omega = 0.39$ $\lambda = 2.56$	Data 25.7 238.4	Model 25.7 238.4	Parameter $\omega = 0.26$ $\lambda = 1.42$	24.5 85.5	Model 24.5 85.5	Parameter $\omega = 0.25$ $\lambda = 2.17$
Savings (% of GDP) Collateral (% of loan) Firms with credit (%)	39 64.6 60.4	Model 39 64.6 60.5	Parameter $\omega = 0.39$ $\lambda = 2.56$ $\psi = 0.13$	Data 25.7 238.4 33.2	Model 25.7 238.4 33.0	Parameter $\omega = 0.26$ $\lambda = 1.42$ $\psi = 0.07$	24.5 85.5 17.4	Model 24.5 85.5 17.5	Parameter $\omega = 0.25$ $\lambda = 2.17$ $\psi = 0.23$
Savings (% of GDP) Collateral (% of loan) Firms with credit (%) Non-perfor. loan (%) Interest rate spread Overhead costs/assets	39 64.6 60.4 8.5	Model 39 64.6 60.5 7.6	Parameter $\omega = 0.39$ $\lambda = 2.56$ $\psi = 0.13$ $p = 0.12$	Data 25.7 238.4 33.2 4.5	Model 25.7 238.4 33.0 3.8	Parameter $\omega = 0.26$ $\lambda = 1.42$ $\psi = 0.07$ $p = 0.11$	24.5 85.5 17.4 19.3	Model 24.5 85.5 17.5 15.7	Parameter $\omega = 0.25$ $\lambda = 2.17$ $\psi = 0.23$ $p = 0.28$
Savings (% of GDP) Collateral (% of loan) Firms with credit (%) Non-perfor. loan (%) Interest rate spread Overhead costs/assets Top 5% emp. share	39 64.6 60.4 8.5 3.3	Model 39 64.6 60.5 7.6 5.8	Parameter $\omega = 0.39$ $\lambda = 2.56$ $\psi = 0.13$ $p = 0.12$ $\chi = 0.16$	Data 25.7 238.4 33.2 4.5 4.3	Model 25.7 238.4 33.0 3.8 6.2	Parameter $\omega = 0.26$ $\lambda = 1.42$ $\psi = 0.07$ $p = 0.11$ $\chi = 0.6$	24.5 85.5 17.4 19.3 6.1	Model 24.5 85.5 17.5 15.7 8.0	Parameter $\omega = 0.25$ $\lambda = 2.17$ $\psi = 0.23$ $p = 0.28$ $\chi = 0.08$
Savings (% of GDP) Collateral (% of loan) Firms with credit (%) Non-perfor. loan (%) Interest rate spread Overhead costs/assets Top 5% emp. share Top 10% emp. share	39 64.6 60.4 8.5 3.3 1.5 29.5 46.3	Model 39 64.6 60.5 7.6 5.8 1.5	Parameter $\omega = 0.39$ $\lambda = 2.56$ $\psi = 0.13$ $p = 0.12$ $\chi = 0.16$ $\eta = 0.37$	Data 25.7 238.4 33.2 4.5 4.3 3.2 52.7 65.7	Model 25.7 238.4 33.0 3.8 6.2 3.1 54.5 66.0	Parameter $\omega = 0.26$ $\lambda = 1.42$ $\psi = 0.07$ $p = 0.11$ $\chi = 0.6$ $\eta = 0.27$	24.5 85.5 17.4 19.3 6.1 1.5 58.4 72.7	Model 24.5 85.5 17.5 15.7 8.0 1.4 62.0 74.2	Parameter $\omega = 0.25$ $\lambda = 2.17$ $\psi = 0.23$ $p = 0.28$ $\chi = 0.08$ $\eta = 0.44$
Savings (% of GDP) Collateral (% of loan) Firms with credit (%) Non-perfor. loan (%) Interest rate spread Overhead costs/assets Top 5% emp. share Top 10% emp. share Top 20% emp. share	39 64.6 60.4 8.5 3.3 1.5 29.5	Model 39 64.6 60.5 7.6 5.8 1.5 34.5	Parameter $\omega = 0.39$ $\lambda = 2.56$ $\psi = 0.13$ $p = 0.12$ $\chi = 0.16$ $\eta = 0.37$	Data 25.7 238.4 33.2 4.5 4.3 3.2 52.7	Model 25.7 238.4 33.0 3.8 6.2 3.1 54.5 66.0 77.0	Parameter $\omega = 0.26$ $\lambda = 1.42$ $\psi = 0.07$ $p = 0.11$ $\chi = 0.6$ $\eta = 0.27$	24.5 85.5 17.4 19.3 6.1 1.5 58.4 72.7 85.9	Model 24.5 85.5 17.5 15.7 8.0 1.4 62.0	Parameter $\omega = 0.25$ $\lambda = 2.17$ $\psi = 0.23$ $p = 0.28$ $\chi = 0.08$ $\eta = 0.44$
Savings (% of GDP) Collateral (% of loan) Firms with credit (%) Non-perfor. loan (%) Interest rate spread Overhead costs/assets Top 5% emp. share Top 10% emp. share	39 64.6 60.4 8.5 3.3 1.5 29.5 46.3	Model 39 64.6 60.5 7.6 5.8 1.5 34.5 46.9	Parameter $\omega = 0.39$ $\lambda = 2.56$ $\psi = 0.13$ $p = 0.12$ $\chi = 0.16$ $\eta = 0.37$	Data 25.7 238.4 33.2 4.5 4.3 3.2 52.7 65.7	Model 25.7 238.4 33.0 3.8 6.2 3.1 54.5 66.0	Parameter $\omega = 0.26$ $\lambda = 1.42$ $\psi = 0.07$ $p = 0.11$ $\chi = 0.6$ $\eta = 0.27$	24.5 85.5 17.4 19.3 6.1 1.5 58.4 72.7	Model 24.5 85.5 17.5 15.7 8.0 1.4 62.0 74.2	Parameter $\omega = 0.25$ $\lambda = 2.17$ $\psi = 0.23$ $p = 0.28$ $\chi = 0.08$ $\eta = 0.44$


QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS

Evaluation of Policy Options

- Reducing the Participation Cost
- Relaxing the Borrowing Constraint
- Increasing Intermediation Efficiency
- Impact on GDP and Inequality


Reducing the Participation Cost

Comparative statics: Credit participation cost—low-income countries




Reducing the Participation Cost

Comparative statics: Credit participation cost—emerging market economies




Relaxing the Borrowing Constraint

Comparative statics: Borrowing constraint—low-income countries




Relaxing the Borrowing Constraint

Comparative statics: Borrowing constraint—emerging market economies




Increasing Intermediation Efficiency

Comparative statics: Intermediation cost—low-income countries



Increasing Intermediation Efficiency

Comparative statics: Intermediation cost—emerging market economies



Impact on GDP and Inequality: A Numerical Comparison

The impact of financial inclusion of various forms on GDP per capita, TFP and income inequality

	Participation cost ψ			Borrow	ing constra	int λ	Intern	Intermediation cost χ	
	GDP(%)	TFP(%)	Gini	GDP(%)	TFP(%)	Gini	GDP(%)	TFP(%)	Gini
Uganda	0.40	0.28	-0.0007	0.35	0.20	0.0007	0.03	0.14	-0.0006
Kenya	0.67	0.40	0.0033	0.28	0.22	0.0001	0.07	0.10	0.0004
Mozambique	0.38	0.28	0.0002	0.29	0.13	0.0011	0.38	0.10	-0.0001
Malaysia	0.38	0.37	-0.0005	0.52	0.32	0.0010	1.10	0.00	0.0015
The Philippines	0.28	0.16	0.0006	0.20	0.15	0.0002	0.04	0.08	-0.0003
Egypt	0.26	1.26	-0.0093	0.46	0.35	0.0003	0.69*	0.02*	0.0033*


Impact on GDP and Inequality: A Numerical Comparison

The impact of financial inclusion of various forms on GDP per capita, TFP and income inequality

	Participation cost ψ			Borrov	ving constra	$int \lambda$	Intermediation cost χ		
	GDP(%)	TFP(%)	Gini	GDP(%)	TFP(%)	Gini	GDP(%)	TFP(%)	Gini
Uganda	5.77	5.67	-0.0210	17.94	10.41	-0.0034	0.74	0.42	0.0018
Kenya	5.16	6.50	-0.0314	12.28	9.30	-0.0203	1.93	0.74	0.0082
Mozambique	12.72	10.16	-0.0267	10.30	4.83	0.0217	0.88	0.32	0.0033
Malaysia	8.44	10.94	-0.0696	4.52	2.85	0.0059	1.26	0.00	0.0013
The Philippines	2.56	3.40	-0.0165	20.21	16.45	-0.0336	1.48	0.58	0.0033
Egypt	7.04	11.31	-0.0590	7.78	6.61	0.0026	0.69	0.02	0.0033

INTERACTIONS AMONG THE THREE FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS

The increase in relative GDP per capita when the borrowing constraint is relaxed by 20% for different credit participation costs and intermediation costs



Decomposition of GDP and TFP

GDP decomposition

		Genera	al Equilibrium	Partia	al Equilibrium
		GDP(%)	Contribution(%)	GDP(%)	Contribution(%)
	Extensive margin	8.94	348.96	3.69	68.08
ψ	Intensive margin	-6.32	-246.73	1.73	31.92
	Savings regime	-0.06	-2.23	0	0
	Total	2.56	100	5.42	100
	Extensive margin	2.75	13.59	9.68	19.61
λ	Intensive margin	24.68	122.13	39.7	80.39
	Savings regime	-7.22	-35.72	0	0
	Total	20.21	100	49.38	100
	Extensive margin	0.09	5.76	0.09	4.27
χ	Intensive margin	1.79	120.70	2.04	95.73
	Savings regime	-0.39	-26.46	0	0
	Total	1.48	100	2.13	100

Decomposition of GDP and TFP

TFP decomposition

		Gener	al Equilibrium	Partia	al Equilibrium
		TFP(%)	Contribution(%)	TFP(%)	Contribution(%)
	Between-regime shifting	7.68	226.02	15.32	471.36
ψ	Credit regime	-0.85	-25.05	-1.69	-51.95
	Savings regime	-3.43	-100.97	-10.38	-319.41
	Total	3.40	100	3.25	100
	Between-regime shifting	22.53	136.95	29.61	296.11
λ	Credit regime	4.16	25.27	-1.04	-104.05
	Savings regime	-10.24	-62.22	-12.56	-125.60
	Total	16.45	100	16.01	100
	Between-regime shifting	0.78	133.98	0.81	142.76
χ	Credit regime	-0.19	-32.36	-0.22	-38.80
	Savings regime	-0.01	-1.62	-0.02	-3.96
	Total	0.58	100	0.57	100

CONCLUSION

