Self-Selection and the Earnings of Immigrants

George Borjas (1987)

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Abstract

- The age-earnings profile of immigrants is steeper than the age-earnings profile of the native population.
- Human capital framework: stronger investment incentives.
- The age-earnings profile of immigrants crosses the age-earnings profile of natives about 10 to 15 years after immigration.
- Unobserved characteristics: immigrants may be more able and more highly motivated.
- But, how cohort quality and immigrant self-selection are related?
- Individuals compare the potential incomes in the U.S. with the incomes in the home countries, and then make the migration decision.
- Variations in political and economic conditions in the countries of origin can explain differences in the earnings of immigrants.

Questions

- What is the role of self-selection and income maximization?
- Are immigrants selected from the upper or lower tail of the income distribution in the sending countries?
- If immigrants are drawn from the upper tail of the income distribution in the home country, does that ensure they end up in the upper tail of the U.S. income distribution?
- If cohort quality has experienced a secular decline in the postwar period, what factors are responsible for this change?

The Model: Assumptions

There are two countries: country 0 (home) and country 1 (destination)

Earning distribution (home country): In $w_0 = \mu_0 + \varepsilon_0$

Earning distribution (destination country): In $w_1 = \mu_1 + \varepsilon_1$

Unobserved charactristics (skill): $\varepsilon_0 \sim N(0, \sigma_0^2)$ & $\varepsilon_1 \sim N(0, \sigma_1^2)$

Time equivalent cost of migrating: $\pi = \frac{C}{w_0}$

The correlation between earnings: $\rho = \frac{\sigma_{01}}{\sigma_0 \sigma_1}$

Each worker knows C, μ_0, μ_1 and his individual epsilons $(\varepsilon_0, \varepsilon_1)$

We only observe ε_0 or ε_1 for any individual

The Model: Equations

1

$$= (\mu_1 - \mu_0 - \pi) + (\varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_0)$$
$$\nu = \varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_0$$

$$z = \frac{(\mu_0 - \mu_1 + \pi)}{\sigma_\nu}$$

$$P = \Pr[\nu > (\mu_0 - \mu_1 + \pi)]$$

 $= 1 - \Phi(z)$

 $\Phi(.)$ is the CDF of the standard normal

The Model: Equations (continued)

$$E(\ln w_0 | l > 0) = \mu_0 + E(\varepsilon_0 | \frac{\nu}{\sigma_\nu} > z)$$
$$= \mu_0 + \frac{\sigma_0 \sigma_1}{\sigma_\nu} (\rho - \frac{\sigma_0}{\sigma_1}) \lambda$$

$$E(\ln w_1 | l > 0) = \mu_1 + E(\varepsilon_1 | \frac{\nu}{\sigma_\nu} > z)$$
$$= \mu_1 + \frac{\sigma_0 \sigma_1}{\sigma_\nu} (\frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_0} - \rho) \lambda$$

$$\lambda = \frac{\phi(z)}{P} = \frac{\phi(z)}{1 - \Phi(z)}$$

 $\phi(.)$ is the PDF of the standard normal λ is the Inverse Mills Ratio (IMR)

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Theoretical Cases: Positive Selection (case 1)

- $Q_0 > 0$ and $Q_1 > 0$
- $\rho > \frac{\sigma_0}{\sigma_1} \text{ and } \frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_0} > 1$
- Correlation between the skills valued in the destination and home country is sufficiently high.
- Destination country has a higher "return to skill" than the home country.
- "The best and the brightest" leave their home countries for greater opportunity.

Theoretical Cases: Negative Selection (case 2)

- $Q_0 < 0$ and $Q_1 < 0$
- $\rho > \frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_0} \text{ and } \frac{\sigma_0}{\sigma_1} > 1$
- Home country is unattractive to low earnings workers because of high wage dispersion.
- These immigrants do not perform well in the destination country's labor market.
- A compressed wage structure "subsidizes" low skill workers, thus attracting low skill workers from abroad.

Theoretical Cases: Refugee Sorting (case 3)

- $Q_0 < 0$ and $Q_1 > 0$
- $\rho < \min(\frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_0}, \frac{\sigma_0}{\sigma_1})$
- Correlation between earnings in the two countries is sufficiently low (could be negative).
- This might occur, for a minority group whose opportunities in the home country are depressed by prejudice.

Theoretical Cases: Fourth Case

- $Q_0 > 0$ and $Q_1 < 0$
- $\rho > max(\frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_0}, \frac{\sigma_0}{\sigma_1})$
- Fourth case is theoretically impossible, since it requires $\rho > 1$.
- People leave the upper tail of the home country income distribution to join the lower tail of the destination country distribution.
- We may have this type of migration in Iran!

Composition & Scale Effects

$$k = \frac{\sigma_1}{\sigma_0}$$
$$\gamma = \left(\frac{\sigma_0 \sigma_1}{\sigma_\nu}\right)(k - \rho)$$
$$Q_1 = \gamma \lambda$$

$$\frac{\partial Q_1}{\partial \mu_0} = \frac{\sigma_0 \sigma_1}{\sigma_\nu^2} (k - \rho) \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial z}$$

$$\frac{\partial Q_1}{\partial \sigma_0} = \frac{\sigma_0 \sigma_1^2}{\sigma_\nu^3} (\rho^2 - 1)\lambda - \frac{\sigma_0^2 \sigma_1}{\sigma_\nu^3} (k - \rho)(1 - \rho k) \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial z} z$$

$$\frac{\partial Q_1}{\partial \rho} = -\frac{\sigma_0^3 \sigma_1}{\sigma_\nu^3} (1 - \rho k) \lambda + \frac{\sigma_0^2 \sigma_1^2}{\sigma_\nu^3} (k - \rho) \frac{\partial \lambda}{\partial z} z$$

Empirical Framework

$$\ln w_i(T) = X_i \theta_T + (\delta + \beta_1 T + \beta_2 T^2) I_i$$
$$+ (\alpha_1 - \beta_2 - 2\beta_2 T) I_i y_i$$
$$+ (\alpha_2 + \beta_2) I_i y_i^2 + \nu_i$$

- The predicted wage differential in 1979 between the most recently arrived immigrant cohort and the native base.
- The rate of wage growth (relative to natives) for an immigrant cohort that has resided in the U.S. for 10 years.
- The predicted wage differential immediately after immigration between the 1979 cohort and the 1955 cohort.

Data Structure

- The data are drawn from the 1970 and 1980 US censuses.
- The complete samples are used in the creation of the immigrant extracts.
- Random samples are drawn for the native "baseline" population.
- Analysis is restricted to men aged 25-64 who:
- was employed in the calendar year prior to the census.
- was not self-employed or working without pay.
- was not in the Armed Forces.
- did not reside in group quarters.

Data Structure (continued)

- All immigrants groups will be compared to a single native base:
- White
- Non-Hispanic
- Non-Asian
- 41 countries were chosen for analysis at least 80 observation of immigrants.
- The 41 countries under analysis account for 90.4 percent of US immigrants.

Regression Results

- Percent ranges from the trivially small (0.04 percent for Brazil and USSR) to the large (10percent for Jamaica).
- Migration flow isnt constant.
- Declining importance of west Europe as a source.
- Increasing importance of Asia and Latin America as a source.
- Changing characteristics of sending countries changed the type of selection that distinguish the immigrant population from the native born.

	1951-80	Immigration	1951–60 Immigrants	1971–80 Immigrants	
Country of Birth	Total Number (in 1000s)	As Percent of 1980 Population ^a	as Percent of 1950 Population ^a	as Percent of 1970 Population ^a	
Europe:					
Austria	48.1	.6	.4	.1	
Czechoslovakia	60.4	.4	.2	.1	
Denmark	30.0	.6	.3	.1	
France	90.1	.2	.1	.04	
Germany	611.5	1.0	.7	.1	
Greece	232.3	2.4	.6	1.1	
USSR	105.4	.04	.02	.02	
Argentina	81.5	.3	.1	.3	
Brazil	43.1	.04	.02	.01	
Canada	676.4	2.8	2.0	.5	
Colombia	165.5	.6	.4	.6	
Cuba	611.9	6.3	1.5	3.2	
Dominican Republic	251.9	4.3	.5	3.4	
Ecuador	96.7	1.2	.3	.8	
Guatemala	45.1	.7	.1	.5	
Haiti	100.2	1.8	.1	1.3	
Jamaica	221.7	10.3	.6	7.3	

Socioeconomic Characteristics

- Year of schooling
- Age
- Age-squared
- Whether health limit work
- Whether married
- Spouse present
- Whether resident of an SMSA
- Income in the year preceding the census as the dependent variable

Model Estimates

	19	70		1980		Rate of Assimilation	1955–79 Change in
Country of Birth	Ι	I · y	I	I·y	$I \cdot y^2$	at $y = 10$	Cohort Quality
Europe:							
Austria	.0189	.0036	.0321	.0034	00003	.0040	.0287
	(.26)	(.75)	(.52)	(.82)	(45)	(.66)	(.20)
Czechoslovakia	1525	.0147	1441	.0127	00019	.0088	0143
	(-2.48)	(3.34)	(-2.79)	(3.23)	(-2.74)	(1.64)	(10)
Denmark	.0838	0033	.2018	0056	.00009	.0068	.2441
	(.82)	(44)	(2.14)	(81)	(.72)	(.78)	(1.21)
France	0785	.0020	.0999	0046	.00005	.0111	.3183
	(-1.28)	(.47)	(2.48)	(-1.33)	(.79)	(2.05)	(2.74)
Germany	.0999	0025	.1409	0047	.00007	0002	.0618
	(3.82)	(-1.37)	(5.40)	(-2.62)	(2.38)	(10)	(1.17)
Egypt	4466	.0421	4586	.0396	00056	.0260	0706
	(-7.00)	(5.67)	(-10.84)	(7.57)	(-4.34)	(4.76)	(57)
India	2847	.0453	4340	.0497	00096	.0179	2845
	(-7.09)	(9.71)	(-21.41)	(16.75)	(-11.03)	(5.33)	(-3.84)
Iran	4078	.0229	3101	.0249	00031	.0294	.2690
	(-4.71)	(3.03)	(-10.19)	(5.45)	(-2.47)	(4.13)	(1.88)
Israel	2998	.0282	3397	.0260	00041	.0128	1314
	(-4.19)	(4.54)	(-8.44)	(5.74)	(-3.84)	(2.11)	(-1.00)
Canada	.0645	.0003	.1165	0013	00000	.0030	.0988
	(2.86)	(.17)	(6.06)	(91)	(21)	(1.50)	(2.17)
Colombia	2247	.0169	4030	.0219	00036	0007	3444
	(-4.33)	(2.74)	(-12.67)	(5.78)	(-3.71)	(17)	(-3.82)
Cuba	4612	.0214	4517	.0208	00025	.0164	.0129
	(-22.20)	(8.89)	(-18.26)	(9.24)	(-5.20)	(9.74)	(.28)

Country Specific Variables

Variable	Definition and Source	Mean	Mini- mum	Maxi- mum	U.S. Value
Politically Competitive System	= 1 if the country had a competitive party system during the entire 1950-73 period; 0 otherwise. Source: Cross-National Time-Series Archive (CNTSA)	.41	-	-	1
Recent Loss of Freedom	= 1 if the country had a competitive party system at the beginning of the period but had a non- competitive party system at the end of the period; 0 otherwise. Source: CNTSA.	.20	-	-	0
Number of Assassinations	Number of politically motivated murders or attempted murders of high government officials or politicians in 1950-73. <i>Source</i> : CNTSA.	3.27	0	22	12
Income Inequality	Ratio of household income of the top 10 percent of the households to the income of the bottom 20 percent of the households. <i>Source</i> : World Bank (various issues) and United Nations (1977).	7.50	1.42	30.0	5.91
Distance from U.S.	Number of air miles (in thousands) between the country's capital and the nearest U.S. gateway (Los Angeles, Miami, or New York). Source: Airline offices contacted by author.	3.37	.18	7.49	-
English Proficiency	Fraction of 1975–80 cohort of immigrants who speak English well or very well. <i>Source</i> : 5/100 A Sample of the 1980 U.S. Census.	.74	.24	1.00	-
Age at Migration	Mean age at migration. Source: 5/100 A Sample	24.56	12.40	32.40	-

Country of Origin	Regression					
Characteristics	1	2	3	4		
Intercept	2214	.1838	9934	9469		
	(-3.88)	(1.06)	(-3.41)	(-3.30)		
Politically Competitive System	.2743	.1306	.1101	.1264		
	(4.49)	(2.01)	(2.16)	(2.39)		
Recent Loss of Freedom	0010	0511	0062	.0136		
	(01)	(75)	(12)	(.25)		
Number of Assassinations	0072	0028	.0021	.0044		
	(-1.20)	(54)	(.51)	(.92)		
Income Inequality	0084	0038	.0039	.0046		
	(-1.78)	(89)	(1.02)	(1.13)		
Distance from U.S.	_	0114	0031	.0018		
		(89)	(31)	(.09)		
English Proficiency	-	.2596	.1980	.2030		
0		(2.20)	(2.12)	(2.21)		
Mean Age at Migration	~	0217	0149	0119		
0 0		(-3.55)	(-2.99)	(2.28)		
ln (per capita GNP)	-	· - /	.1164	.1015		
			(4.57)	(3.77)		
Country in Asia or Africa	-	-	`- ´	1145		
,				(-1.58)		
Country in North or				()		
South America	-			0640		
				(73)		
R^2	.504	.681	.808	.826		

Country of Origin	Regression					
Characteristics	1	2	3	4		
Intercept	.0076	0240	0237	0280		
	(2.96)	(-3.88)	(-1.50)	(-2.32)		
Politically Competitive System	0029	0068	0068	0091		
	(-1.06)	(-2.66)	(-2.60)	(-4.28)		
Recent Loss of Freedom	.0063	.0029	.0030	.0021		
	(1.81)	(1.21)	(1.15)	(1.06)		
Number of Assassinations	.0008	.0006	.0006	.0008		
	(2.68)	(2.36)	(2.14)	(3.07)		
Income Inequality	0001	00002	00002	.0002		
× •	(50)	(11)	(10)	(.90)		
Distance from U.S.	-	.0003	.0003	0027		
		(.74)	(.70)	(-2.89)		
English Proficiency	-	.0138	.0138	.0122		
с ,		(3.27)	(3.20)	(3.70)		
Mean Age at Migration	-	.0009	.0009	.0009		
0 0		(4.28)	(3.95)	(4.72)		
ln (per capita GNP)	-	-	00002	.0021		
			(01)	(1.83)		
Country in Asia or Africa	-	-	-	.0151		
2				(5.11)		
Country in North or						
South America	-	-	-	0080		
				(-2.08)		
R^2	.302	.704	.704	.842		

Country of Origin	Regression					
Characteristics	1	2	3	4		
Intercept	3194 (-3.19)	9951 (-3.97)	-1.1779 (-4.08)	-2.2202 (-4.69)		
Politically	. ,	. ,	. ,	. ,		
Competitive						
System	.1760	.1075	.0712	.0630		
-	(2.54)	(1.60)	(.97)	(.70)		
Recent Loss of						
Freedom	.1256	.1468	.1272	.1310		
	(1.67)	(2.16)	(1.81)	(1.33)		
Number of						
Assassinations	.0077	.0156	.0122	.0256		
	(1.19)	(2.32)	(1.69)	(2.00)		
Rate of Change in						
Central Government						
Expenditures	.0698	.0699	.0641	0099		
-	(1.60)	(1.75)	(1.60)	(21)		
Rate of Change in Per						
Capita GNP	4.7010	3.0956	1.1567	-1.5321		
	(2.27)	(1.60)	(.46)	(50)		
ln (per capita GNP)	_	.0889	.1186	.2443		
		(1.93)	(3.22)	(4.15)		
Country in Asia or						
Africa	-	-	.1374	-		
			(1.42)			
Country in North or						
South America	-	-	.0274	-		
			(.41)			
Change in Quota	-	-	-	.0034		
-				(2.26)		
R ²	.284	.418	.453	.581		

Country of Origin	Regression			
Characteristics	1	2		
Intercept	6060	-1.1614		
	(-1.30)	(-2.46)		
Politically Competitive				
System	.1206	.0801		
2	(1.13)	(.81)		
Recent Loss of Freedom	.1096	0365		
	(.95)	(32)		
Number of Assassinations	0245	0337		
	(-2.65)	(-3.65)		
Income Inequality	0113	0145		
1 9	(-1.51)	(-2.00)		
Distance from U.S.	1332	1271		
	(-6.11)	(-2.68)		
English Proficiency	.1661	.0488		
6	(.94)	(.30)		
ln (per capita GNP)	1130	0441		
d I	(-2.14)	(83)		
Country in Asia	()	()		
or Africa	_	3386		
		(2.19)		
Country in North		(2.17)		
or South America	-	2923		
		(1.52)		
x ²	98.45	108.82		

Thanks !