The aim of the course is to introduce students to the most essential topics in microeconomic theory. Students should acquire a thorough understanding of economic theory relevant to the topics covered. The course is designed to complement the Microeconomics 1 offered last term. Topics include choice under uncertainty, game theory, market failure, firm behaviour in oligopolistic framework, moral hazard, adverse selection, and social choice.
Sunday & Tuesday 8:00 – 9:30; Room 7
Room 118; Saturday 14:30 – 15:30 or by appointment (email: firstname.lastname@example.org)
The evaluation of the course is based on quizzes (15%), mid-term exam (40%), and final exam (45%).
Quizzes: The schedule will be agreed in class.
Mid-term exam: Wednesday 1395/02/01 at 9:00 am
Final Exam: TBA.
The main textbooks for the course is:
Mas-Colell, Andreu, Michael D. Whinston & Jerry R. Green: Microeconomic Theory; Oxford University Press..
We also use the following textbooks for some topics and the problem sets (some other papers and books might be added to the list later in the term):
Jehle, Geoffrey A. & Philip J. Reny; Advanced Microeconomic Theory; Addison-Wesley.
Kreps, David; A Course in Microeconomic Theory; Harvester Wheatsheaf.
Osborne, Martin; An introduction to Game Theory; Oxford University Press.
Rubinstein, Ariel; Lecture Notes in Microeconomic Theory; Princeton University Press.
Varian, Hal; Microeconomic Analysis; W. W. Norton and Company
Following is a list of the topics we intend to cover in this course alongside the textbook chapters for each topic. There is a possibility that not all the material in some chapters of textbooks will be covered, which will be announced in lectures accordingly. On the other hand, some other text or notes might be used for some of the topics which we intend to cover in greater details.
|1||Sun||94 11 18||Chapter 6: Choice under Uncertainty|
|2||Tue||94 11 20|
|3||Sun||94 11 25|
|4||Tue||94 11 27|
|5||Sun||94 12 02||Chapter 7: Basic Elements of non-Cooperative Games|
|6||Tue||94 12 04|
|7||Sun||94 12 09|
|8||Tue||94 12 11||Chapter 8: Simultaneous-Move Games (Excl. 8.C & 8.F)|
|9||Sun||94 12 16|
|10||Tue||94 12 18|
|Sun||94 12 23|
|11||Tue||94 12 25||Chapter 9: Dynamic Games (Excl. 9.D)|
|Sun||95 01 01|
|Tue||95 01 03|
|Sun||95 01 08|
|Tue||95 01 10|
|12||Sun||95 01 15|
|13||Tue||95 01 17|
|14||Sun||95 01 22||Chapter 11: Externalities and Public Goods|
|15||Tue||95 01 24|
|16||Sun||95 01 29|
|17||Tue||95 01 31|
|18||Sun||95 02 05||Chapter 12: Market Power (Excl. 12.D, 12.E, 12.F, & 12.G)|
|19||Tue||95 02 07|
|20||Sun||95 02 12|
|21||Tue||95 02 14||Chapter 13: Adverse Selection, Signaling, and Screening (Excl. 13.D)|
|22||Sun||95 02 19|
|23||Tue||95 02 21|
|24||Sun||95 02 26||Chapter 14: The Principal-Agent Problem (Excl. 14.C & 14.D)|
|25||Tue||95 02 28|
|26||Sun||95 03 02|
|26||Tue||95 03 04|
|27||Sun||95 03 09||Chapter 21: Social Choice Theory|
|28||Tue||95 03 11|